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Partnering with the US Census Bureau, we implement a new sur-
vey of “structured” management practices in two waves of 35,000 
manufacturing plants in 2010 and 2015. We find an enormous dis-
persion of management practices across plants, with 40 percent 
of this variation across plants within the same firm. Management 
practices account for more than 20 percent of the variation in pro-
ductivity, a similar, or greater, percentage as that accounted for by 
R&D, ICT, or human capital. We find evidence of two key drivers 
to improve management. The business environment, as measured 
by  right-to-work laws, boosts incentive management practices. 
Learning spillovers, as measured by the arrival of large “Million 
Dollar Plants” in the county, increases the management scores of 
incumbents. (JEL D22, D24, L25, L60, M11, M50)
The interest of economists in management goes at least as far back as On the 
Sources of Business Profits by Francis Walker (1887), the founder of the American 
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Economic Association and the Superintendent of the 1870 and 1880 Censuses.1 This 
interest has persisted until today. For example, Syverson’s (2011, p. 336) survey of 
productivity devotes a section to management as a potential driver, noting that “no 
potential driver of productivity differences has seen a higher ratio of speculation to 
actual empirical study.” Work evaluating differences in management is often limited 
to relatively small samples of firms (e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997), 
developing countries (e.g., Bloom et al. 2013; Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2018), or 
particular historical episodes (e.g., Giorcelli 2019). In addition, although previous 
work on larger samples has measured differences in management across firms and 
countries, there is no  large-scale work on the variations in management between the 
plants2 within a firm.
There are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that management matters for 
performance. Gibbons and Henderson (2013) argue that management practices are 
a key reason for persistent performance differences across firms due to relational 
contracts. Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) emphasize the role of complementar-
ities among management and organizational practices. Halac and Prat (2016) show 
that “engagement traps” can lead to heterogeneity in the adoption of practices even 
when firms are ex ante identical. By examining the first large sample of plants with 
information on management practices, this paper provides empirical evidence for 
the role that these practices play in both firm and plant performance and investigates 
the causal drivers of why some plants adopt such practices while others do not.
We partnered with the Economic Programs Directorate of the US Census Bureau 
to develop and conduct the Management and Organizational Practices Survey 
(MOPS).3 This is the  first-ever mandatory government management survey, cover-
ing two separate waves of over 35,000 plants in 2010 and 2015, yielding over 70,000 
observations.4 The sample size, panel structure, high response rate of the survey, its 
coverage of units within a firm, its links to other Census data, as well as its compre-
hensive stratified population coverage of industries and geographies makes it unique, 
and enables us to address some of the major gaps in the recent management literature.
We start by examining whether our management measures are linked to perfor-
mance. We find that plants using more structured management practices have higher 
levels of productivity, profitability, growth, survival rates, and innovation. These 
relationships are robust to a wide range of controls including industry dummies, 
education, plant, and firm age. The relationship between management practices and 
performance also holds over time within plants (plants that adopted more of these 
practices saw improvements in their performance) and across establishments within 
firms at a point in time (establishments within the same firm with more structured 
management practices achieve better performance outcomes).
The magnitude of the  productivity-management relationship is large. Increasing 
structured management from the tenth to ninetieth percentile can account for about 
1 Walker was also the second president of MIT and the vice president of the National Academy of Sciences. 
Arguably Adam Smith’s discussion of the Pin Factory and the division of labor was an even earlier antecedent.
2 Because we are focusing on manufacturing, we use the words “plants” and “establishments” interchangeably.
3 These survey data are available to qualified researchers on approved projects via the Federal Statistical 
Research Data Center (FSRDC) network and online in tables (https://www2.census.gov/ programs-surveys/mops/
tables/2015/ mops-survey-tables/mops_survey_tables.pdf) and in aggregated anonymized form (http://manage-
mentresearch.com/methodology/). 
4 See the descriptions of MOPS in Buffington et al. (2017) and online Appendix A. 
1650 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MAY 2019
22 percent of the comparable 90–10 spread in productivity. This is about the same 
as R&D, more than human capital, and almost twice as much as Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT). Of course, all of these magnitudes are depen-
dent on a number of other factors, such as the degree of measurement error in each 
variable, but they do highlight that variation in management practices is likely a 
key factor accounting for the  much-discussed heterogeneity in firm productivity. 
Technology, human capital, and management are interrelated but distinct: when we 
examine them jointly, we find they account for about 44 percent of productivity 
dispersion.
We then turn to examining the variation in management practices across plants, 
showing three key results. First, there is enormous  inter-plant variation in man-
agement practices. Although 18 percent of establishments adopt  three-quarters or 
more of a package of basic structured management practices regarding monitoring, 
targets, and incentives, 27 percent of establishments adopt less than one-half of 
such practices. Second, about 40 percent of the variation in management practices 
is across plants within the same firm. That is, in  multi-plant firms, there is consid-
erable variation in practices across units.5 The analogy for universities would be 
that variations in management practices across departments within universities are 
almost equally large as the variations across universities. Third, these variations in 
management practices are increasing in firm size. That is, larger firms have substan-
tially more variation in management practices. This appears to be largely explained 
by the greater spread of larger firms across different geographies and industries.
We then examine some “drivers” of management practices. We focus our analysis 
on two main candidates: the business environment (in particular  right-to-work laws) 
and learning spillovers from large plant entry primarily belonging to multinational 
corporations. We chose these drivers for three reasons. First, we have credible causal 
identification strategies. Second, they are highly topical with multiple changes in the 
2010–2015 time period spanned by our MOPS panel. Third, we show geography 
plays an important role in shaping variations in management practices.  Bloom et 
al. (2017), the working paper version of this paper, also has analysis of two other 
drivers: product market competition and education.
On business environment, we exploit two types of  quasi-experiments over 
 right-to-work (RTW) laws (Holmes 1998). First, between the two waves of our 
management panel in 2010 and 2015, two states (Michigan and Indiana) introduced 
RTW laws in 2012, so this enables us to construct a  difference-in-differences (DID) 
design using contiguous states as comparison groups. We find that RTW rules increase 
structured management practices around pay, promotion, and  dismissals but seem to 
have little impact on other practices. To demonstrate that our DID design indeed cap-
tures the causal effect of RTW on management, we show that there is no evidence for 
5 A literature beginning with Schmalensee (1985) has examined how the variance in profitability of business 
across business divisions decomposes into effects due to company headquarters, industry, and other factors. Several 
papers have examined productivity differences across sites within a single firm. For example, Chew, Clark, and 
Bresnahan (1990) looked at 40 operating units in a commercial food division of a large US corporation (the top-
ranked unit had revenue-based total factor productivity twice as high as the bottom-ranked); Argote, Beckman, 
and Epple (1990) showed large differences across 16 Liberty shipyards in World War II; and Blader, Gartenberg, 
and Pratt (2016) examine productivity differences across sites within a large trucking company. Freeman and 
Shaw (2009) contains several studies looking at performance differences across the plants of single multinational 
corporations. 
1651BLOOM ET AL.: WHAT DRIVES DIFFERENCES IN MANAGEMENT PRACTICES?VOL. 109 NO. 5
 differential  pre-trends for the states switching to RTW compared to control states. 
Furthermore, we use states that switched  post-2015 (i.e., outside our data win-
dow) to run a placebo analysis, showing again no evidence for changes in manage-
ment between 2010 and 2015 for these placebo states. In our second approach, we 
implement a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design where we use distance 
to the border as a running variable and crossing the border as our discontinuity 
threshold. The results from the RD design are very similar to the ones we find in 
the DID.
To investigate learning spillovers, we build on Greenstone, Hornbeck, and 
Moretti’s (2010) identification strategy using “Million Dollar Plants” (MDPs), large 
investments for which both a winning county and a  runner-up county are known. 
Comparing the counties that “won” the large, typically multinational plant versus 
the county that narrowly “lost,” we find a significant positive impact on the manage-
ment practices of incumbent plants in the county. Importantly, the positive spillovers 
only arise if the plant is in an industry where there are frequent flows in managerial 
labor from the MDP’s industry, suggesting that the movement of managers is a 
mechanism through which learning occurs. We also show positive impacts on jobs 
and productivity.
The existing management and productivity literature is motivated by a number 
of different theoretical perspectives (e.g., Penrose 1959, Syverson 2011, Gibbons 
and Roberts 2013). One perspective that binds our drivers together follows Walker 
(1887) and considers some forms of structured management practices to be akin 
to a  productivity-enhancing technology. This naturally raises the question of why 
all plants do not immediately adopt these practices. One factor is information: not 
all firms are aware of the practices or believe that they would be beneficial. This 
motivates our examination of  diffusion-based learning and informational spillovers 
from Million Dollar Plants. Another factor is institutional constraints such as union 
power: this motivates our examination of regulation, in particular  right-to-work 
laws. Of course, there are many other factors that can influence structured manage-
ment, and we hope that the data we have generated and made available will help 
future researchers isolate other drivers.
Our paper also builds on a rich empirical literature on the effects of management 
and organizational practices on performance. One group of papers uses  cross-sectional 
or occasionally panel data on management (or organizational) practices and firm per-
formance. Examples of this would include Black and Lynch (2001, 2004); Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002); Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002); Cappelli and 
Neumark (2001); Easton and Jarrell (1998); Huselid (1995); Huselid and Becker 
(1996); Ichniowski and Shaw (1999); and Osterman (1994). These studies tend to 
find positive associations in the cross sections, but they tend to disappear in the panel 
(see the survey by Bloom and Van Reenen 2011). The sample response rates are also 
usually low (at least compared with the MOPS) and the frames usually tilted toward 
very large firms. Another group of studies focuses on smaller numbers of firms some-
times even looking across sites in a single firm (labeled “insider econometrics” by 
Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2004). Examples would include Bartel, Ichniowski, 
and Shaw (2007); Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005, 2007); Griffith and Neely 
(2009); Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003); Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 
(1997); and Lazear (2000). These tend to focus on specific forms of management 
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practices such as incentive pay. Much has been learned from these studies, but because 
samples are small, it is difficult to generalize across larger swathes of the economy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section I, we describe the management 
survey. In Section II, we outline the relationship between management and perfor-
mance. In Section III we detail the variation of management practices across and 
between firms. And in Section IV, we examine potential drivers of management 
practices. Finally, in Section V we conclude and highlight areas for future analysis. 
Online Appendices go into more detail on data (A), theory (B), and a comparison 
with the World Management Survey (C).
I. Management and Organizational Practices Survey
The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) was jointly 
funded by the Census Bureau, the National Science Foundation, the MIT Initiative 
on the Digital Economy, the Sloan Foundation, and the Kauffman Foundation. It 
was fielded in 2011 and 2016 as a supplement to the 2010 and 2015 Annual Survey 
of Manufactures (ASM), with response required by law.6 The original design was 
based in part on a survey tool used by the World Bank and adapted to the United 
States through two years of development and cognitive testing by the Census 
Bureau.7 It was sent electronically as well as by mail to the ASM respondent for 
each establishment, which was typically the plant manager, financial controller, 
CEO, CFO, or general manager (see online Appendix Table A1 for details). Most 
respondents (58 percent in 2010 and 80 percent in 2015) completed the survey elec-
tronically, with the remainder completing the survey by paper.  Non-respondents 
were mailed a  follow-up letter after six weeks if no response had been received. A 
second  follow-up letter was mailed if no response had been received after 12 weeks. 
The first  follow-up letter included a copy of the MOPS instrument. An administra-
tive error occurred in 2010 when merging electronic and paper collection data that 
caused some respondents to receive the first  follow-up even though they had already 
responded, and as a result, in some cases there were two different sets of respon-
dents for the same plant. We exploit this accident to deal with measurement error in 
the management scores in Section II.
A. Measuring Management
The survey in both waves contained 16 management questions in three main 
areas: monitoring, targets, and incentives, based on the World Management Survey 
(WMS) of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). This was itself based in part on the 
principles of continuous monitoring, evaluation and improvement from Lean manu-
facturing (e.g., Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).8 The survey also contained ques-
tions on other organizational practices (such as decentralization) based on work by 
6 For more details, see Buffington et al. (2017). Note that MOPS surveys for calendar year X are sent in spring 
of year X + 1 to collect retrospective data.
7 See Buffington, Herrell, and Ohlmacher (2016) for more information on the testing and development of the 
MOPS.
8 The 16 questions which are the main focus of this paper did not change over the two waves of the MOPS. 
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Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) as well as some background questions on 
the plant and the respondent.9
The monitoring section asked firms about their collection and use of informa-
tion to monitor and improve the production process. For example, the survey asked, 
“How frequently were performance indicators tracked at the establishment?,” with 
response options ranging from “never” to “hourly or more frequently.” The tar-
gets section asked about the design, integration, and realism of production targets. 
For example, the survey asked, “What was the  time-frame of production targets?,” 
with answers ranging from “no production targets” to “combination of  short-term 
and  long-term production targets.” Finally, the incentives section asked about 
 non-managerial and managerial bonus, promotion, and reassignment/dismissal 
practices. For example, the survey asked, “How were managers promoted at the 
establishment?,” with answers ranging from “mainly on factors other than perfor-
mance and ability, for example tenure or family connections” to “solely on perfor-
mance and ability.” 10
In our analysis, we aggregate the results from these 16 questions into a single 
measure which we call “structured management.” This management score is the 
unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where the responses 
to each question are first scored to be on a  0–1 scale. Thus, the summary measure is 
scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 representing an establishment that selected the category 
which received the lowest score (little structure around performance monitoring, 
targets, and incentives) on all 16 management dimensions and 1 representing an 
establishment that selected the category that received the highest score (an explicit 
structured focus on performance monitoring, detailed targets, and strong perfor-
mance incentives) on all 16 dimensions (see more details in online Appendix A and 
online Appendix Table A2).
Figure 1 plots the histogram of plant management scores for the 2010 wave, 
which displays enormous dispersion.11 While 18 percent of establishments have a 
management score of at least 0.75, meaning they adopt 75 percent of the most struc-
tured management practices, 27 percent of establishments receive a score of less 
than 0.5 (that is, they adopt less than one-half of the practices).
Finally, our data collection includes recall questions (in 2015 asking about 2010 
and in 2010 asking about 2005). This allows us to construct recall measures for the 
management score in 2005, and for missing observations in 2010. By comparing the 
actual management scores in 2010 to the 2010 recall values from the 2015 survey, 
we can also benchmark the quality of recall responses. Not surprisingly, we find that 
a key variable that determines the quality of recall management score is the tenure 
at the establishment of the manager responding to the survey: if the respondent’s 
tenure started at least one year before the period of the recall, response quality is 
9 The 2015 MOPS survey wave also included questions on two new content areas, “Data and Decision Making” 
and “Uncertainty.” See Buffington et al. (2017) for more information on the differences in content between survey 
waves of the MOPS. MOPS has since been used in several other countries with various modifications: see http://
managementresearch.com/. It has been used by at least one company: see https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
blogs/research-matters/2019/02/fresh_uses_for_them.html.
10 The full questionnaire is available at: https://www.census.gov/ programs-surveys/mops/ technical-
documentation/questionnaires.html. 
11  The average management score over the entire sample is 0.615 (see online Appendix Table A4). We test and 
find that (controlling for recall dummy) management score is marginally (0.013) higher in 2015 compared to 2010. 
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high.12 As a result of this benchmarking exercise, we only use 2005 and 2010 recall 
values for the management score when the survey respondent has at least seven 
years of tenure at the establishment. We also include a “recall dummy” in regres-
sions to control for the fact that some observations are using recall data.
B. Sample and Sample Selection
The sampling frames for the 2010 and 2015 MOPS were the 2010 and 2015 ASM 
respectively, which included around 50,000 plants in each wave.13 The response 
rate for the first survey wave was approximately 78 percent, and the response rate 
for the second survey wave was approximately 74 percent.14 For most of our anal-
ysis, for each wave we further restrict the sample to establishments with at least ten 
 non-missing responses to management questions that also have positive value added 
12 For 2015 managers answering 2010 questions, if the respondent started at the establishments in 2008 or ear-
lier, the correlation between recall and actual 2010 management scores is 0.48. As discussed below, the correlation 
between management scores collected from two managers in the same plant at the same time is 0.55: close to the 
recall correlation for managers with long tenure, suggesting high recall fidelity. 
13 Note that sample counts have been rounded for disclosure reasons throughout the paper.
14 The Census Bureau also constructs a measure of response coverage called the Unit Response Rate (URR). 
The URR is measured as the number of establishments included in the published tables divided by the number of 
establishments in the mail sample less those establishments for which there is evidence that they are inactive or 
 out-of-scope. The URR for the 2015 survey wave was approximately 71 percent. See https://www.census.gov/ 
programs-surveys/mops/ technical-documentation/methodology.html for more information on the URR.
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Figure 1. The Wide Spread of Management Scores across Establishments
Notes: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each ques-
tion is first normalized to be on a 0–1 scale. The sample is all 2010 MOPS observations with at least 11 non-missing 
responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, 
and have positive value added, positive employment, and positive imputed capital in the ASM. Figure is weighted 
using ASM weights.
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and positive employment and for which we were able to impute a capital measure. 
Online Appendix Table A3 shows how our various samples are derived from the 
universe of establishments.
Online Appendix Table A4 provides more descriptive statistics. The mean estab-
lishment size is 177 employees and the median (fuzzed) is 86. The average estab-
lishment in our sample has been in operation for 21 years,15 44 percent of managers 
and 9.8 percent of  non-managers have college degrees, 12.2 percent of workers are 
in unions, and 67.9 percent of plants are part of larger  multi-plant firms. Finally, 
online Appendix Table A5 reports the results for linear probability models for the 
different steps in the sampling process for the 2010 MOPS wave. We show that 
establishments that were mailed and responded to the MOPS survey are somewhat 
larger and more productive compared to those that did not respond, but these differ-
ences are quantitatively small.
C. Performance Measures
In addition to our management data, we also use data from other Census 
and  non-Census datasets to create our measures of performance. We use 
 establishment-level data on sales,  value-added, and labor inputs from the ASM to 
create measures of growth and labor productivity. As described in detail in online 
Appendix A, we also combine capital stock data from the Census of Manufactures 
(CM) with investment data from the ASM and apply the Perpetual Inventory Method 
to construct capital stock at the establishment level, which we use to create measures 
of total factor productivity.16 For innovation, we use  firm-level data from the 2010 
Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) on R&D expenditure and patent 
applications by the establishment’s parent firm from the USPTO.
II. Management and Performance
Given the variations in management practices noted above, an immediate ques-
tion is whether these practices link to performance outcomes. In this section, we 
investigate whether these more structured management practices are correlated with 
five alternative measures of performance (productivity, profitability, innovation, sur-
vival, and growth). Although there is good reason to think management practices 
affect performance from both theory and extensive case literature, we do not neces-
sarily attribute a causal interpretation to the results in this section. Instead, it suffices 
to think about these results as a way to establish whether this management survey is 
systematically capturing meaningful content rather than just statistical noise.
15 Measured age is defined as the number of years the establishment has been alive in the Longitudinal Business 
Database (LBD), starting from its first year in 1976. Hence, age is truncated at 30 years in 2005, and we keep the 
same truncation for 2010 and 2015 for comparability over years.
16 We use TFP as shorthand for  revenue-based Total Factor Productivity (TFPR). This will contain an element of 
the  mark-up (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008 and Hsieh and Klenow 2009) but is likely to be correlated 
with quantity-based TFP (see Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 2013). For a detailed discussion about micro-
level measures of TFP, see Foster et al. (2017).
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A. Management and Productivity
We start by looking at the relation between labor productivity and management. 
Suppose that the establishment production function is
(1)   Y it =  A it  K it α  L it β  I  it γ  e  δM it    e μ X it   ,
where Yit is output (shipments deflated by NAICS six-digit price deflator), Ait is (total factor) productivity (excluding management practices), Kit denotes the estab-
lishment’s capital stock at the beginning of the period, Lit are labor inputs, Iit are 
intermediate inputs (materials plus energy), Xit is a vector of additional factors such 
as education, and Mit is our management score.
17 Management is an inherently 
 multidimensional concept, but for this study we focus on a single dimension: the 
extent to which firms adopt more structured practices.18
Dividing by labor and taking logs we can rewrite this in a form to estimate on the 
data:
(2)  log (  Y it  __ L it ) = α log (  K it  __ L it ) + γ log (  I it  __ L it  ) +  (α + β + γ − 1) log ( L it  ) + δ M it  
 +  μ  X it  +  f i +  τ t +  u it , 
where we have substituted the productivity term (Ait) for a set of industry (or firm 
or establishment) fixed effects  f i , time dummies  τ t , and a stochastic residual uit. 
Because we may have multiple establishments per firm, we also cluster our standard 
errors at the firm level.
In column 1 of Table 1, we start by running a basic regression of labor pro-
ductivity (measured as log(output/employee)) on our management score without 
any controls other than year and recall dummies. The sample pools responses from 
2015 and 2010 and the recall information for 2005 and 2010 (asked in 2010 and 
2015 respectively). We find a highly significant coefficient of 1.351, suggesting that 
every 10 percentage point increase in our management score is associated with a 
14.5 percent (= exp(0.1351) − 1) increase in labor productivity. To get a sense of 
this magnitude, our management score has a sample mean of 0.615 and a stan-
dard deviation of 0.172 (see the sample statistics in online Appendix Table A4), so 
that a one  standard deviation change in management is associated with a 26.2 per-
cent (= exp(0.172 × 1.351)) higher level of labor productivity. We provide more 
detailed analysis of magnitudes in  Section IIE. In column 2 of Table 1, we estimate 
the full specification from equation (1) with capital, intermediates, labor, employee 
17 We put the management score and Xit controls to the exponential simply so that after taking logs we can 
include them in levels rather than logs. 
18 The individual practices are highly correlated, which may reflect either a common underlying driver or com-
plementarities among the practices (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom 2013). In this exercise, we use the mean of the share 
of practices adopted, but other measures like the principal factor component or  z-score yield very similar results. 
Indeed, we show in online Appendix Table A6 that key results in this section hold when we use every management 
 question individually instead of an overall index. 
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education, and industry dummies on the right-hand side. This reduces the coefficient 
on management to 0.209.
Even after conditioning on many observables, a key question that remains is 
whether our estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) management coefficient cap-
tures a relation between management and productivity, or whether it is just cor-
related with omitted factors that affect the management score and the productivity 
measure. To address this, we focus on plants which were in the 2010 and 2015 
panel, drop all recall data, and estimate models including plant fixed effects in 
order to, at least partially, address this concern over omitted factors.19 As long as 
the unobserved factors that are correlated with management are fixed over time 
at the establishment level (corresponding to  f i in equation (2)), we can difference 
them out by running a fixed effect panel regression. Column 3 reports the results 
for the  2010–2015 pooled panel regression (including a 2015 time dummy). The 
19 The sample is smaller because we drop 2005, and also because it conditions on establishments where we have 
data on management (and other factors) in both 2010 and 2015. This means we have to drop plants that entered or 
exited after 2010, and plants that were not part of the ASM rotating panel.
Table 1—Plant Management Scores and Performance 
log(output/employment) Profit/sales log(output/emp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 1.351 0.209 0.079 0.096 0.074 0.095 0.051 0.105
 (0.039) (0.013) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.005) (0.010) (0.045)
        
log(capital/emp) 0.100 0.012 0.096 0.096 0.026 0.023 0.004
(0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.017)
 
log(material/emp) 0.495 0.333 0.525 0.534 −0.068 −0.069 0.309
(0.004) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.030)
 
log(employment) −0.027 −0.192 −0.054 −0.053 −0.002 −0.009 −0.217
 (0.002) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.034)
    
Share employees 0.223 0.013 0.180 0.179 0.023 0.025 0.064
 w/ a college degree (0.015) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.007) (0.011) (0.066)
Observations ~82,500 ~82,500 ~33,000 ~43,000 ~43,000 ~82,500 ~43,000 ~10,000
Num. establishments ~52,500 ~52,500 ~16,500 ~26,500 ~26,500 ~52,500 ~26,500 ~5,000
Num. firms (clusters) ~32,500 ~32,500 ~9,800 ~5,100 ~5,100 ~32,500 ~5,100 ~4,200
Panel-
Sample All All Panel Multi-plant firm All Multi-plant Same responder
Fixed effects None Industry Establish. Firm Firm × year Industry Firm × year Establish.
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). The management score is 
the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be on 
a 0–1 scale. The sample in columns 1, 2, and 6 is all MOPS observations with at least 10 non-missing responses to 
management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have posi-
tive value added, positive employment, and positive imputed capital in the ASM. Recalls are used for respondents 
with at least seven years of tenure at the establishment. Sample in column 3 includes only establishments with 2 
observations (in 2010 and 2015 excluding recalls). Sample in columns 4, 5, and 7 includes establishments that have 
at least 1 sibling (i.e., from the same parent firm) in MOPS within the year. Column 8 reports results for the sam-
ple in column 3 restricted to establishments with same respondent for 2010 and 2015. In columns 1 through 5 and 
8, the dependent variable is log(real output over total employment). In column 6 and 7, profits are measured by 
value added minus wages and salaries over total value of shipments. All regressions include year fixed effect and 
recall dummy.
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coefficient on management, 0.079, remains significant at the 1 percent level. Of 
course, this coefficient may still be upwardly biased if management practices are 
proxies for  time-varying unobserved productivity shocks. These could include 
 firm-specific changes in leadership styles, culture, or other factors that also happen 
to be correlated with the management practices that we measure, and our results 
should be interpreted accordingly. On the other hand, the coefficient on management 
could also be attenuated toward zero by measurement error, and this downward bias 
is likely to become much worse in the  fixed effect specification.20
The rich structure of our data also allows us to compare  firm-level versus 
 establishment-level management practices. In particular, by restricting our analysis 
to  multi-establishment firms, we can check whether there is a correlation between 
structured management and productivity within a firm. Column 4 of Table 1 shows 
OLS estimates for the  subsample of  multi-establishment firms with firm fixed effects 
included. The management coefficient of 0.096 is highly significant. In this column, 
the coefficient on management is identified partially off the variation of manage-
ment and productivity across plants within each firm in a given year, but also from 
the time series variation of plants across firms within the panel. To use solely the 
first source of variation we also include firm-by-year dummies in column 5 which 
leads to a management coefficient of 0.074. Hence, even within the very same firm, 
when management practices differ across establishments, we find large differences 
in productivity associated with variations in management practices.21 This is reas-
suring, since we will show in Section III that there is a large amount of management 
variation across plants within the same firm.
How do these estimates compare with earlier results? The easiest way to make 
the comparison is to consider the association between TFP and a one standard devi-
ation change in the management index. Call this δM. Using column 2 of Table 1, 
we have a coefficient of 0.209 and a standard deviation of the management score 
of 0.172. Therefore, δM = 0.036. In the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) study using 
WMS data, equivalent estimates from column 4 of their Table 1 is 0.040, which is 
δM = 0.040 (their management measures are already  z-scored to be in standard 
deviation units).22 So these associations seem broadly comparable between the two 
datasets. Online Appendix C gives a detailed comparison of two methods of col-
lecting management data in the MOPS and WMS and show a strong correlation 
between the two measures where we have overlapping firms.
Firms care more about profits rather than productivity per se, so we use the oper-
ating profits to sales ratio as an alternative measure of firm performance in the next 
two columns of Table 1. Column 6 has the same specification as column 2 except 
20 There is certainly evidence of this from the coefficient on capital, which falls dramatically when establish-
ment fixed effects are added, which is a common result in the literature.
21 Running regressions in the cross section with firm fixed effects is an even more general model as we (i) allow 
the coefficients on the factor inputs (and other controls) to be  year-specific and (ii) we switch off the time series 
variation of  plant-specific productivity and management within a firm. When running cross-section regressions 
with firm dummies separately in each MOPS wave, we obtain significant coefficients on management in each year 
of a similar magnitude to the pooled estimate in column 5. This shows that the variation from (i) and (ii) are not 
contributing much to the identification of the management coefficient in column 5.
22 In the  firm-level version of the MOPS data, the coefficient on management is 0.307 (from online Appendix 
Table A10) and the standard deviation is 0.16. This implies βM = 0.307 × 0.16 = 0.049, slightly higher than the 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) estimates.
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with profits as the dependent variable and column 7 mimics column 5 including firm 
by time dummies. We observe a significant management coefficient in both of these 
specifications. Figure 2 shows that in the raw data we observe a positive correlation 
with productivity and profits, and also with measures of innovation such as patents 
and R&D,23 as well as with hourly production wages.
One of the issues of concern is whether plant managers “talk up” their manage-
ment practices regardless of the underlying reality. If this bias is stable over time, 
then by including plant fixed effects we control for this potential bias. But it could 
be that the bias changes over time. One way that this would be revealed would be 
by comparing across different respondents. Were this to be a first order concern, the 
 productivity-management relationship might be different when a different manager 
answered the survey in 2015 than in 2010 compared to when the same manager 
answered the survey in both years. Column 8 of Table 1 reports results for when the 
survey was answered by the same individual respondent in 2010 and 2015, revealing 
a similar coefficient.
23 See, for example, Henderson and Cockburn (1994) for a model linking managerial competence and innovation. 
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Figure 2. Performance and Structured Management
Notes: The management score is the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each ques-
tion is first normalized to be on a 0–1 scale. The sample in panels A, B, and F is all MOPS observations with at least 
10 non-missing responses to management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in 
ASM tabulations, have positive value added, positive employment, and positive imputed capital in the ASM. The 
sample in panels C, E, and F only uses observations where we have 2010 MOPS management data. “Exit rate” 
indicates whether a plant alive in 2011 had exited the economy by 2015. In panels E and F, we also condition on 
non-missing R&D or patents requests count in the BRDIS survey. Management deciles are recalculated for the dif-
ferent samples. The figures are unweighted.
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B.  Cross-Industry Heterogeneity in the  Performance-Management Relationship
So far, we have established a strong correlation between labor productivity and 
the adoption of management practices. It is likely that this relation is somewhat 
contingent on the firm’s environment, and that the adoption of particular manage-
ment practices is more important in some contexts than in others. To investigate this 
heterogeneity, we estimate the specification in column 2 of Table 1 for the 86 4-digit 
manufacturing NAICS categories. Online Appendix Figure A1 plots the smoothed 
histogram of the 86 regression coefficients.24 To avoid over estimating the disper-
sion in management coefficients, we apply an Empirical Bayes Shrinkage proce-
dure.25 The distribution is centered on 0.2, which reassuringly is the coefficient 
from the pooled regression. All establishments operate in industries with a posi-
tive labor  productivity-management relation. There is indeed a lot of heterogeneity 
between sectors, and an  F-test for the null of no difference across industries is easily 
rejected (  p-value < 0.001). These findings suggest that the importance of structured 
management varies across environments, as one would expect.
We leave a more thorough investigation of the reasons for this heterogeneity for 
future research, but we did examine whether structured management was less import-
ant for productivity in sectors where innovation mattered a lot (e.g., high industry 
intensities of R&D and/or patenting), as perhaps an  over-focus on productive effi-
ciency could dull creativity. Interestingly, we found that the  productivity-management 
relationship was actually stronger in these high tech industries, perhaps implying 
that rigorous management is as important in R&D labs as it is in production plants.
C. Measurement Error
Before turning to additional performance outcomes, we take a moment here to dis-
cuss concerns about measurement error. Estimates in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
from independent repeat management surveys (at the same point of time) imply 
that measurement error accounts for about one-half of the variation in management 
score, making this an important issue. Including establishment fixed effects controls 
for measurement error in the management score if it is plant-specific and fixed over 
time. But we can go further in characterizing measurement error by exploiting a 
valuable feature of the 2010 MOPS survey, which is that approximately 500 plants 
from our baseline sample have two surveys filled out by different respondents. That 
is, for this set of plants, two individuals (for example, “John Doe” the plant manager 
and “Jane Smith” the financial controller) both independently filled out the MOPS 
survey. This is most likely because a  follow-up letter was mailed to a random set of 
plants in error that included a form and online login information, and an individual 
other than the original respondent received the letter. We confirm this measurement 
also turns out to be independent of any firm- or  plant-level observable characteristics 
such as employment, productivity, or the number of plants in the firm (see online 
Appendix Table A7), and thus appears to be effectively white noise. These double 
24 To comply with Census disclosure avoidance requirements, we do not report the actual coefficients industry 
by industry, but a smoothed histogram.
25 We follow closely Chandra et al. (2016). 
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responses are extremely valuable in enabling an accurate gauge of survey measure-
ment error, because within a  three-month window we have two measures of the 
same  plant-level management score provided by two separate respondents.
First, we use these duplicate responses to estimate the degree of measurement 
error by correlation analysis. Assuming that the two responses have independent 
measurement error with standard deviation  σ e 2, and defining  σ m 2  as the true man-
agement standard deviation, the correlation between the two surveys will be 
 σ m 2 /( σ m 2    +   σ e 2), and the measurement error share will be  σ e 2/( σ m 2    +   σ e 2) = 0.454, 
where  ( σ m 2   +  σ e 2) is the variance of the observed management score on 500 double 
score sample and  σ e 2 is one-half of the variance of the difference between the first 
and second management score .  Interestingly, this 45 percent share of the variation 
from measurement error is very similar to the 49 percent value obtained in the World 
Management Survey from second independent telephone interviews (Bloom and 
Van Reenen 2007).
Second, we use these duplicates to instrument one management score with the 
other to overcome attenuation bias in our OLS performance estimates. We per-
form this analysis in Table 2, starting by analyzing output in the first row. First, 
in column 1 we regress log(output) on management for the entire sample. Then in 
column 2 we  re-run this estimate on the 500 duplicates finding a very similar esti-
mation coefficient, suggesting this duplicate sample is similar to the whole sample. 
Column 3 is the key specification in which we instrument the first management 
score with its second duplicate score, finding that the point estimate roughly dou-
bles from 4.465 to 9.174. In column 4 we compare these OLS and IV coefficients 
to estimate that measurement error accounts for about 51 percent of the manage-
ment variation. We repeat this exercise for log(employment) in the second row, for 
log(output/employee) in the third row (replicating column 1 of Table 1), and for 
Table 2—Management and Performance, Accounting for Measurement Error
Baseline
Duplicates
sample
Duplicates
sample Implied share 
measurement error OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: log(output) 4.264 4.465 9.174 0.513
(0.057) (0.398) (1.073)
Dependent variable: log(employment) 2.913 3.401 6.949 0.511
(0.044) (0.348) (0.890)
Dependent variable: log(output/employment) 1.351 1.094 2.344 0.533
(0.039) (0.266) (0.563)
Dependent variable: log(output/employment) 0.535 0.549 1.104 0.503
Deviations from industry mean (0.02) (0.201) (0.389)
Observations ~82,500 ~500 ~500
Notes: Each row reports the results from regressions on a different dependent variable listed in the left column. 
Columns 1 to 3 report regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the firm level) for 
regressions ran on three different specifications. Column 1 reports results from OLS regressions for the baseline 
sample (as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1). Columns 2 and 3 report results from OLS and IV regressions for the 
sample with duplicate reports. In column 3, each management score is instrumented using the duplicate report. 
Regressions in columns 1 include year fixed effects and a recall dummy.
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industry  normalized log(output/employee) in the fourth row. These produce qual-
itatively similar results to the first row: (i) the 500 establishment duplicate sample 
yields a similar coefficient on management to the whole sample; and (ii) the IV esti-
mates are roughly twice the OLS estimates (similar to the 45 percent estimate of 
measurement error from the 2 management score variances and covariance noted 
above). These results imply that about half the variation in the management data is 
measurement error.
D. Management Practices, Survival, and Growth
In Table 3, we focus on two other important outcomes: survival or its flipside, exit 
(panel A) and employment growth (panel B). Because the Census tracks the survival 
and employment of all plants in the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), we 
have up to five years of data on the MOPS 2010 cohort (2015 is the last year where 
we have reliable data at time of writing).26 In column 1 we examine whether estab-
lishments have exited the economy by the end of December 2015. The coefficient 
26 As additional years of the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) become available, we can examine increas-
ingly  long-run relationships between management practices, employment, and survival. 
Table 3—Management, Exit, and Growth
Time window 2010 to 2015 2014 to 2015 2010 to 2015 2010 to 2015 2010 to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Dependent variable: exit
Management −0.180 −0.035 −0.286 −0.153 −0.280
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.033) (0.014) (0.033)
log(value added/emp) −0.025 −0.039
(0.003) (0.006)
Marginal R2 for management^ 0.506 0.665
Marginal R2 for log(value 
 added/emp)^
0.308 0.482
Panel B. Dependent variable: employment growth
Management 0.412 0.088 0.629 0.326 0.609
 (0.033) (0.018) (0.075) (0.035) (0.075)
log(value added/emp) 0.078 0.131
(0.007) (0.013)
Marginal R2 for management^ 0.394 0.535
Marginal R2 for log(value
 added/emp)^
0.525 0.915
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No Yes
Observations ~32,000 ~29,000 ~17,000 ~32,000 ~17,000
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). The management score is 
the unweighted average of the score for each of the 16 questions, where each question is first normalized to be on a 
0–1 scale. The sample in column 1 and 4 is all MOPS observations with valid management score in 2010 and a suc-
cessful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have positive value added, positive employ-
ment, and positive imputed capital in the ASM. In column 2, we use the same sample but also condition on survival 
up to 2014. In columns 3 and 5, we use the 2010 sample from column 1 but also condition on the establishment 
having a sibling in the sample (i.e., same parent firm).  In panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes 
the value of 1 for exit between the two years listed in the Time window row. In panel B, the dependent variable is 
employment growth between the two years specified in the Time window row. Growth between years s and t is cal-
culated as 2 × ( L t −  L s )/( L t +  L s ) following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). ^ denotes R2 scaled up by 100 to show 
enough significant figures.
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is large and highly significant (−0.180). This indicates that a one standard devia-
tion increase in the management score (0.172) is associated with a 3.1 percentage 
point reduction in the probability of establishment death, which is 26 percent of the 
mean death rate of 11.8 percent.27 In column 2, we test if the 2010 management 
score can predict the exit rates 5 years later between 2014 and 2015, and find that it 
can. This highlights how the management score has significant predictive power for 
 longer-run as well as  shorter-run plant performance.
In column 3 of Table 3, we include firm effects in the Exit by 2015 equation of 
column 1. We still observe a negative and significant coefficient, showing that even 
within the same firm, a plant with a relatively low management score is relatively 
more likely to be closed down. Interestingly, this coefficient is even larger than in col-
umn 1. A possible interpretation is that for a single plant firm, it is the market signal 
of negative profits that should induce exit. In contrast, for a  multi-plant firm, the head-
quarters is deciding which plants to shut down and this might be easier to accomplish 
(e.g., by moving assets and employment from one plant to another). Hence, such cre-
ative destruction may be more easily implemented within firms than between them.28
In column 4 of Table 3, we include 2010 labor productivity (value added per 
worker) into the specification of column 1 and then add firm by year fixed effects 
in column 5. Less-productive plants are more likely to exit, but the coefficient on 
management practices is robust to this and remains significant. Since management 
practices and productivity are correlated, the coefficient on management practices 
falls. For example, in column 4 it is −0.153 compared to −0.180 in column 1. 
Strikingly, the contribution of management practices in accounting for exit is larger 
than productivity (e.g., a marginal  R 2 of 0.005 for management practices compared 
to 0.003 for productivity in column 4).
In panel B of Table 3, we repeat the specifications of panel A using employ-
ment growth as the outcome. 29 The findings here mirror the exit analysis with firms 
who had higher management scores in 2010 being significantly more likely to grow 
over the next five years. Using the results from column 1, a one standard deviation 
increase in management practices is associated with 7 percent faster growth.
One interesting extension we ran on Table 3 is to examine if the association 
between management practices and plant performance varied with plant age. In 
short (details in online Appendix Table A8) the management score was much more 
strongly related to growth and survival for younger plants: for example, the exit rela-
tionship was twice as strong for plants aged 5 years or less compared to those older 
than 20 years. This is consistent with many standard models of market selection 
(e.g., Jovanovic 1982; Hopenhayn 1992; Melitz 2003; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, 
and Scarpetta 2013) where plants have a heterogeneous managerial capability 
when they are born, but there follows a rapid selection process where the weaker 
27 In Bloom et al. (2017), we showed that management predicts exits also at shorter horizons. The coefficients 
become monotonically more negative as the horizon becomes longer (by about 3 to 4 percentage points per year). 
Since establishment death is an absorbing state this is what we would expect.
28 See Davis et al. (2014) for related evidence on this issue. They show that firms taken over by private equity 
downsize inefficient plants and expand efficient plants much more aggressively than other firms. As we show in 
Section III, there is substantial plant heterogeneity in management within the same firm, suggesting that changing 
management on the intensive margin may be hard to achieve easily.
29 Growth between years  s and  t is calculated as 2 ×  (  L t −   L s ) / ( L t +  L s ) following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
1664 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MAY 2019
 establishments exit the market (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2017, for an 
example of this type of model). When incumbent plants have matured to their steady 
state size, there is less of a relationship between growth and management practices 
(random management shocks will lead to some relationship).30
We also ran a series of other robustness tests on Tables 1 and 3, such as using 
standardized  z-scores (rather than the  0–1 management scores), dropping indi-
vidual questions that might be  output-related and using ASM sampling weights, 
and found very similar results. We also looked at a  nonparametric analysis of the 
 management-size relationship (online Appendix Figure A2), finding a strongly pos-
itive relationship of management with both establishment size and firm size. This 
is also quantitatively large: average establishment size more than doubles going 
from about 50 employees for establishments with an average management score 
of approximately 0.52 (the  twenty-fifth percentile) to about 120 employees for 
establishments with a management score of approximately 0.74 (the seventy-fifth 
percentile). Finally, we examined whether management could simply be proxying 
for other unobserved cultural or organizational features of the establishment (e.g., 
Gibbons and Henderson 2013). These are by nature hard to observe but in online 
Appendix Table A9 we look at decentralization (a measure of the distribution of 
power between the plant manager and corporate headquarters) and  data-driven deci-
sion making. While these are informative in terms of productivity, our management 
indicator remains robust to including these as additional controls.
E. Magnitudes of the Management and Productivity Relationship
To get a better sense of the magnitudes of the relationship between management 
practices and productivity, we compare management practices to other factors that 
are commonly considered important drivers of productivity: R&D (Research and 
Development spending), Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), and 
human capital. We focus on these three because they are leading factors in driving 
productivity differences (e.g., discussed in detail in the survey on the determinants 
of productivity in Syverson 2011), and because we can measure them well using the 
same sample of firms used for the analysis of the management  practices-productivity 
link. In particular, we ask how much of the productivity spread can be accounted for 
by the spread of management practices, R&D expenditure per worker, ICT invest-
ment per worker (spending on information and communication technology hard-
ware and software), and human capital (measured as the share of employees with a 
college degree). We do this analysis at the firm level as  establishment-level R&D is 
not the appropriate level for  multi-plant firms.
Columns 1–4 of Table 4 report the results from  firm-level regressions of log labor 
productivity (value added per worker) on those four factors individually. All of these 
factors are positively and significantly related to productivity. To obtain an aggre-
gate  firm-level labor productivity measure, the dependent variable is calculated as 
the weighted (by the plant shipment share of firm shipments)  industry-demeaned 
30 Note that it is not obvious why TFP should be any more strongly related to management for young firms 
under this class of models. Indeed, in online Appendix Table A8 we do not find any systematic relationship in the 
 TFP-management relationship by plant age.
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 plant-level labor productivity.31 This is then regressed on the  firm-level value of the 
management score in column 1. The bottom row of column 1 shows that the  90-10 
spread in management practices accounts for about 22 percent of the spread in labor 
productivity. In columns 2 to 4 we examine R&D, ICT, and skills and find these 
measures account for 21.6 percent, 12 percent, and 15.9 percent of the  90–10 pro-
ductivity gap, respectively. Column 5 shows that the role of management practices 
remains large in the presence of the other factors, and that jointly these can account 
for about 44.1 percent of the  90–10 productivity spread in productivity. Similar con-
clusions come from other ways of accounting for productivity dispersion. For exam-
ple, the contribution of each factor to the standard deviation of firm log(value added 
per worker) is 19.3 percent (management), 21.6 percent (R&D), 13.5 percent (ICT), 
and 14.2 percent (skills). The results in Table 4 highlight that our measure of man-
agement practices can account for a relatively large share of  firm-level productivity.
There are several alternative approaches to looking at magnitudes. First, we 
used TFP32 instead of labor productivity even though this is problematic as we 
are now summing across plants in industries with heterogeneous technologies 
when aggregating to the firm level. Nevertheless, the contribution of each factor 
to the  90–10 spread is similar to Table 4: 18.1 percent (management practices), 
16.9 percent (R&D), 7.5 percent (ICT), 11.1 percent (skills), and 32.5 percent 
31 To obtain the  firm-level measure of the right-hand-side variables, we weight the  right-hand variables by 
their plant’s share of total shipments (exactly as we do for the dependent variable). Results are robust to using the 
 non-demeaned measure or other weighting schemes.
32 We use a two-factor estimate of TFP in these calculations to be consistent with Table 4 which uses value 
added as the dependent variable.
 Table 4—Drivers of Productivity Variation 
Firm level log(labor productivity)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Management score 0.864    0.612
 (0.043)    (0.043)
R&D 0.133   0.095
 (0.010)   (0.010)
ICT/worker  0.062  0.047
  (0.006)  (0.006)
Skills (percent employees with college degree)   0.800 0.208
   (0.064) (0.060)
Observations ~18,000 ~18,000 ~18,000 ~18,000 ~18,000
Share of 90–10 explained 0.216 0.216 0.120 0.159 0.441
Share of SD explained 0.193 0.219 0.134 0.142 0.282
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). Dependent variable is firm 
level log(Value Added/Employment) built from industry de-meaned plant-level log(Value Added/Employment) 
weighted up by plant’s shipments. Right-hand-side variables are Management score, R&D from BRDIS measured 
as log(1 + R&D intensity) where R&D intensity is the total domestic R&D expenditure divided by total domestic 
employment, ICT investment per worker (1,000 × spending on information and communication technology hard-
ware and software per employee), Skill measured by the share of employees (managers and non-managers) with a 
college degree. All of these variables are also weighted up to the firm level using plant’s total value of shipments. 
Missing values have been replaced by 0 for R&D and by means for the other variables. Industry demeaning is at 
NAICS6 level. All regressions are weighted by the number of establishments in the firm. Share of 90–10 explained 
is calculated by multiplying the coefficient on the key driver variable (e.g., management in column 1) by its 90–10 
spread and dividing this by the 90–10 spread of productivity. Share of SD explained corresponds to the square root 
of the R2 in the regression.
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(all 4).33 Second, we can simply run the analogous production functions of Table 
1, but at the firm level instead of plant level. Online Appendix Table A10 does this. 
Although the absolute level of the contribution of management practices (and the 
other factors) falls compared to Table 4, the relative contribution of management 
practices continues to remain as large as that of R&D and larger than that of ICT or 
skills.
One obvious caveat throughout this management practices and performance anal-
ysis is causality, which is hard to address with this dataset. In related work, Bloom 
et al. (2013) run a randomized control trial varying management practices for a 
sample of Indian manufacturing establishments with a mean employment size of 
132 (similar to our MOPS sample average of 167). They find evidence of a large 
causal impact of management practices towards increasing productivity, profitabil-
ity, and firm employment. Other  well-identified estimates of the causal impact of 
management practices, such as the RCT evidence from Mexico discussed in Bruhn, 
Karlan, and Schoar (2018) and the management assistance natural experiment from 
the Marshall plan discussed in Giorcelli (2019), find similarly large impacts of man-
agement practices on firm productivity.
Given the evidence of the strong relationship between establishment performance 
and management, after briefly examining variation in management practices within 
firms we then turn to looking at two drivers of structured management practices 
where we believe we have credible causal identification.
III. Management Practices across Plants and Firms
One important question is to what extent do these variations in management prac-
tices across plants occur within rather than between firms? The results in Tables 1 
and 3 suggest that there is enough within firm (across plant) variation even in the 
cross section to uncover a relationship between plant productivity and plant man-
agement. The voluminous  case-study literature on management practices34 often 
highlights the importance of variations both within and between organizations, but 
until now it has been challenging to measure these separately due to the lack of large 
samples with both firm and plant variation.
The benefit of the MOPS sample in addressing this question is twofold. First, the 
large sample means we have thousands of firms with multiple plants. Second, thanks 
to 500 double plant surveys we can control for measurement error, which would oth-
erwise inflate the within-firm  cross-plant variation. Armed with the earlier estimates 
that 45 percent of the variation in measured management was measurement error, 
we can now decompose the remaining variation in the management score into the 
part accounted for by the firm and the part accounted for by the plant. To do this, 
we keep the  sample of 16,500 plants (out of 32,000 plants) that are in firms with 2 
33 About 50 percent of  firm-level TFP appears to be measurement error according to  Collard-Wexler (2013) and 
Bloom et al. (2018). Under the assumption that this measurement error is uncorrelated with the factors in Table 4 
this implies these four factors can potentially account for about  two-thirds of the true ( non-measurement error) 
variation in TFP.
34 For example, Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) cite 11 case studies about variations in management practices 
and performance including Berg and Fast (1975); Barley (1986); Brynjolfsson, Renshaw, and van Alstyne (1997); 
and Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2002).
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or more plants in the MOPS survey in 2010. Although this sample only contains 44 
percent of the overall number of observations in the sample, these are larger plants 
and account for 74 percent of output in the MOPS sample.
The first series in Figure 3 (diamonds) plots the share of the  plant-level variation 
in the management score accounted for by the parent firm in firms with 2 or more 
plants after scaling by (0.546 =  1 − 0.454) to account for measurement error. To 
understand this graph, first note that the top left point is for firms with exactly two 
plants. For this sample, firm fixed effects account for 90.4 percent of the adjusted 
R 2 in management variation across plants,35 with the other 9.6 percent accounted 
for by variation across plants within the same firm. So, in smaller  two-plant firm 
samples, most of the variation in management practices is due to differences across 
firms.
Moving rightward along the  x-axis in Figure 3, we see that the share of man-
agement variation attributable to the parent firm declines as firm size rises.36 For 
example, in firms with  50–74 plants, the parent firm accounts for about 40 percent of 
the observed management variation, and in firms with 150 or more plants, the  parent 
firm accounts for about 35 percent of the variation. Hence, in samples of plants 
35 It is essential for this part of the analysis that the adjusted R2 on the firm fixed effects is not mechanically 
decreasing in the number of establishments in the firm. To alleviate any such concern, we simulated management 
scores for establishments linked to firms with the same sample characteristics as our real sample (in terms of num-
ber of firms and number of establishments in a firm), but assuming no firm fixed effects. We then verified that indeed 
for this sample, the adjusted R2 is zero and does not show any pattern over the number of establishments in a firm. 
36 The number of establishments on the  x-axis is calculated using the LBD, counting all manufacturing estab-
lishments associated with the parent firm. 
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Figure 3. The Firm-Level Share of The Variation in Management Scores 
(after Removing Measurement Error)
Notes: Dots show the share of management score variation accounted for by the firm with different numbers of man-
ufacturing establishments ranging from that number to the next value. So, for example, 50 plants refers to 50–74 
plants. The share of variation is shown after removing the 45.4 percent accounted for by measurement error. The 
bootstrap sampled 95 percent confidence interval shown in gray shading. Sample of 16,500 establishments across 
the 3,100 firms with 2 or more plants in the 2010 MOPS survey. Industry variation is captured by six-digit NAICS 
dummies and geographic variation by MSA dummies (State is the MSA if MSA is missing). The horizontal line is 
the average share of the variation in score management across plants accounted for by firms, which is 58 percent.
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from larger firms, there is relatively more  within-firm variation and relatively less 
 cross-firm variation in management practices. The horizontal solid red line plotted 
shows the average share of variation in management scores across plants accounted 
for by the parent firm in our sample, which is 58 percent.
At least two important results arise from Figure 3. First, both  plant-level and 
 firm-level factors are important for explaining differences in management practices 
across plants, with the average share of management variation accounted for by firms 
being 58 percent (so 42 percent is across plants within the same firm). Second, the 
share of management practice variation accounted for by the parent firm is declining 
in the overall size of the firm, as measured by the number of establishments.
What explains the large fraction of  within-firm variation in management prac-
tices? One likely explanation is that within a firm, different establishments operate 
in different environments: for example, different industries or locations. To evaluate 
this explanation, the second series in Figure 3 (green dots) repeats the analysis with 
one change: when we run the regressions of management on firm fixed effects (used 
to recover the adjusted R2), we control for the part of the management score that is 
explained by within firm/across plant industry and MSA variation.37 This essen-
tially removes the  within-firm share of variation in management that is explained 
by industry and geographical variation. There are two points to highlight from this 
exercise. First, by construction, the overall  within-firm management variation is 
smaller, going down from 42 percent on average to 19 percent. Second, the relation 
between size and  within-firm variation is flatter. Although we see a clear downward 
slope for firms with under ten plants, we cannot reject the null that the  within-firm 
variation is similar for all firms with ten or more plants. This is consistent with 
larger firms (those with more than ten plants) operating across more industries and 
geographical regions, which accounts for their greater within firm spread in man-
agement practices.
We further explore these points in Table 5, reporting results from a regression of 
the  within-firm standard deviation of the management score on firm level character-
istics. Consistent with the first series in Figure 3 (blue diamonds), column 1 demon-
strates that the standard deviation of management within a firm is increasing with the 
number of establishments in the firm, and that this relation is stronger for firms with 
10 establishments or less (column 2). Column 3 shows that operating in more indus-
tries and over more locations are both correlated with a larger  within-firm spread of 
management. Column 4 is consistent with the results in the second series in Figure 3 
(green dots): controlling for the number of  within-firm industries and locations, the 
relationship between management spread and size weakens and becomes insignif-
icant for firms with more than ten manufacturing establishments. Column 5 shows 
that the  within-firm spread of management is larger with more ownership changes.38
37 Specifically, the R2 regressions include now the linear projection of management from a regression of man-
agement on full sets of NAICS and MSA dummies (where for plants in areas without an MSA, the state is used), 
where the regression also includes firm fixed effects. The sample for this regression is identical to both series in 
Figure 3.
38 We also looked at ownership changes over longer periods and found evidence suggesting it takes at least three 
years after a firm acquires a new plant to significantly change its management practices (consistent with earlier 
evidence in Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012). 
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The importance of geographical location stands out in Table 5, being signifi-
cant across all columns. This motivates us to consider geographical factors that may 
help explain the wide variation of management practices across plants.
IV. Drivers of Management Practices
The previous literature on management has pointed to a wide variety of potential 
factors driving management practices. We focus on two, business environment and 
learning spillovers, for which we have credible identification strategies and signifi-
cant spatial variation. Online Appendix B describes a simple model to help interpret 
the coefficients of the effect of these drivers on management (and other outcomes 
like measured TFP).
A. Business Environment
The business environment in which plants operate is often thought to be a major 
factor for understanding the variation in management across plants. As a measure of 
the business environment, we use  right-to-work (RTW) laws, which are  state-level 
laws prohibiting agreements between  employers and  labor unions that require 
employees’ membership, payment of union dues, or fees as a condition of employ-
ment, either before or after hiring. They now cover 28 states, and have been growing 
in coverage. We use two identification strategies to examine the causal impact of 
RTW on management. First, we use a DID approach exploiting the introduction of 
RTW in two states in 2012. Second, in the spirit of Holmes (1998) we use a spatial 
RD design around state boundaries.
Table 5—Within-Firm (and Across-Plant) Variation in Management 
Dependent variable: Standard deviation of management spread within firm
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of manufacturing 0.959     
 establishments (in logs) (0.091)     
Number of manufacturing est. 1.370  0.560 0.593
 × (10 establishments or smaller) (0.231)  (0.284) (0.283)
Number of manufacturing est. 0.679  0.133 0.112
 × (larger than 10 establishments) (0.204)  (0.231) (0.23)
Number of manufacturing  0.378 0.29 0.269
 industries (in logs)  (0.147) (0.171) (0.171)
Number of manufacturing  1.040 0.883 0.872
 states (in logs)  (0.140) (0.186) (0.186)
Share of MOPS est. with ownership    1.650
 change in the prior year    (0.808)
Number of firms ~3,100 ~3,100 ~3,100 ~3,100 ~3,100
Notes: A firm-level regression with the standard deviation of management scores across establishments within the 
firm as the dependent variable. The regression sample is all firms with two or more establishment responses in the 
MOPS 2010 survey. The total number of establishments, the number of establishments within manufacturing, the 
number of different industries, and the different number of states these establishments span are all calculated from 
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). Change of ownership is defined as share of MOPS establishments with 
a different FIRMID as compared to a base year’s LBD (e.g., LBD 2009 for 09–10). In all columns, we control for a 
fifth-degree polynomial of average management score at the firm. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. For scaling purposes, all coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100.
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Difference-in-Differences (DID).—In 2012, two US states (Michigan and 
Indiana) introduced RTW laws. Since we have waves of the management survey in 
2010 and 2015 we can run a DID analysis of management changes between 2010 and 
2015 comparing these states to their neighbors. The treatment states are compared 
to their contiguous neighbors: Ohio, Illinois, and Kentucky.39 We do not use the 
neighboring state of Wisconsin as it introduced  right-to-work laws right at the end 
of our panel (in 2015). Three other states, West Virginia (2016), Kentucky (2017), 
and Missouri (2017), introduced  right-to-work laws after our sample  period.40 This 
enables us to run a placebo test on these three states to examine whether other events 
triggering a successful RTW vote could be influencing management rather the RTW 
laws themselves.
Our empirical analysis relies on a standard DID specification,
(3)  M it m =  θ 1 ( RTW s ×  POST t ) +  θ 2  X i,t +  ω s +  τ t +  ϵ it , 
where  M it m indicates the management practice score of plant i in year t, the super-
script m indicates whether we are considering subsets of the management score 
such as incentives practices,  RTW s is a dummy for the two RTW states, POSTt is 
a dummy for the years after the introduction of RTW in 2012 (i.e., a dummy for 
2015), Xi,t are other observable controls (NAICS6 dummies and a recall dummy), ω s are state dummies,  τ t are time dummies, and  ϵ it is an error term.
Table 6 contains the results for our baseline specification in panel A. Column 1 
reports a positive but insignificant coefficient on the treatment variable. RTW is 
likely to primarily affect “incentives practices” over human resources such as 
tying pay, firing, and promotion to employees’ ability and performance. Unions 
frequently oppose these practices which they believe give too much discretion to 
employers, so if unions are weakened by RTW then these incentives practices will 
likely become more prevalent. Consequently, column 2 looks specifically at these 
incentive practices as an outcome (questions 9 through 16 in the MOPS question-
naire). The coefficient is twice as large as column 1 and significant at the 5 per-
cent level in this specification. In column 3 we examine  non-incentive management 
practices (the other 8 MOPS questions on monitoring and targets, which are much 
less directly related to RTW laws), and find a precisely estimated 0 coefficient. 
The test for equality of these coefficients rejects equality at the 10 percent level 
(  p-value = 0.053).
In column 4 of Table 6, we examine unionization directly as the most likely mech-
anism through which the RTW effect might operate. In the MOPS survey, union 
density is in bins so we create a dummy indicating where 80 percent or more of 
workers are union members. RTW has a negative and significant effect on the prev-
alence of these highly unionized plants. This is as expected since the introduction of 
39 The large sample size (35,000 plants) for each MOPS wave, plus the high density of manufacturing plants 
in these states, means that pooling over 2005, 2010, and 2015 we have about 17,000 observations for this DID 
regression analysis. 
40 In Missouri, RTW legislation was signed into by Governor Eric Greitens in February 2017, but implementa-
tion was postponed as there was a successful petition to hold a public referendum over the law. On August 7, 2018 
voters on the referendum opposed the law. 
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RTW eliminates the need for all employees to be a union member.41 Columns 5 and 
6 look at two performance related outcomes. Column 5 shows that RTW has a pos-
itive and significant effect on size of establishments as measured by employment, 
and column 6 shows a small, but insignificant positive effect of about 1.6 percent on 
TFP. The absence of a RTW effect on measured TFP may seem surprising given the 
positive effects on management, but one potential explanation is the greater entry 
of plants in RTW states increases demand for scarce inputs and so drives up relative 
41 We also checked whether the effect was larger for establishments in industries characterized by higher union 
density (as measured  pre-law changes in 2010). We have found no robustly significant difference in the response to 
RTW laws across industries in this dimension. For example, in the specification of column 2 in panel C, including 
an interaction of Post × Treat with a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment’s industry had union 
density in the top quartile generated a coefficient (standard error) of 0.007 (0.014).
Table 6—Difference-in-Differences Estimates for the Effect of Right-to-Work 
Overall 
management 
Incentive 
management
Non-
incentive 
management
High union 
(density > 
80%) log(emp)
3 Factor 
log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. DID estimates for the effect of right-to-work
Post × Treat 0.006 0.013 −0.000 −0.019 0.117 0.016
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.026) (0.013)
Panel B. Placebo in states in years before right-to-work introduction
Post × Treat 0.007 0.014 0.002 −0.020 0.132 0.018
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.027) (0.013)
Pre × Treat −0.004 −0.002 −0.007 0.002 −0.057 −0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.033) (0017)
Panel C. DID estimates controlling for NAICS trends and state trends 
Post × Treat 0.016 0.021 0.003 -0.015 0.200 0.029
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0007) (0.049) (0.024)
Observations ~17,000 ~17,000 ~17,000 ~17,000 ~17,000 ~17,000
Panel D. Placebo using West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri 
Post × Treat 0.001 0.004 −0.001 −0.007 0.007 −0.013
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028) (0.016)
Observations ~27,000 ~27,000 ~27,000 ~27,000 ~27,000 ~27,000
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the establishment level). Post is a dummy 
for 2015, and in panels A through C Treat is an indicator for Michigan and Indiana (states which introduced RTW 
in 2012), so Post × Treat identifies the effect of the policy change. Pre is a dummy for 2010 so Pre × Treat in 
panel B is a test for pre-policy introduction trends. In panel D, Treat is a dummy for West Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Missouri (three states which passed RTW laws after 2015) so this is an alternative placebo. The dependent vari-
able is the overall 16 question management score in column 1. In columns 2 and 3 the score is calculated as the 
unweighted average of the incentives related practices (MOPS questions 9–16) and non-incentives related practices 
(MOPS questions 1–8) respectively. The dependent variable in column 4 is calculated using the categories in MOPS 
question 36 (2010 numbering). The dependent variable in column 5 is log of employment at the establishment, and 
in column 6 the log of total factor productivity, calculated using a factor share of three factors (capital, labor, and 
material). The sample in panels A through C is all MOPS observations with at least ten non-missing responses to 
management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have positive 
value added, positive employment, and positive imputed capital in the ASM from treated and neighboring states for 
the years 2005, 2010, and 2015. Recalls are used for respondents with at least seven years of tenure at the establish-
ment. The sample in Panel D is defined similarly to the Panel A sample, but for the placebo states and their neigh-
boring states. All regressions include year and state fixed effects, NAICS dummies, and a recall dummy. In panel C, 
we also include state trends and NAICS trends.
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input prices (such as land and local materials prices).42 These “congestion effects” 
will tend to bias measured TFP downward and in principle, a driver could even 
appear to have a negative effect. This is a more general concern with TFP and we 
discuss this issue in more detail below in relation to MDPs (see online Appendix B 
for a formal discussion).
An obvious concern with the DID strategy is that there may be  pre-policy 
trends, so that incentives management, employment, and productivity might have 
increased even in the absence of the RTW policy change. To assess this we include 
Pre × Treat as an additional control where Pre is a dummy for 2010. The coefficient 
on Pre × Treat reflects a  pseudo-experiment as if a RTW vote was passed between 
2005 and 2010 in the states who actually passed the laws in 2012. In panel B of Table 
6 we find that there is no significant effect, which is consistent with the hypothesis of 
no  pre-policy trends contaminating the treatment effects. Panel C presents an even 
more rigorous test which takes the specification from panel A and interacts the full 
set of NAICS6 dummies and state dummies with linear time trends. The results in 
panel C are broadly similar to the previous ones with a larger and (weakly) signifi-
cant coefficient on incentives management in column 2, but not for  non-incentives 
management in column 3.
Finally, as noted above, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri introduced 
 right-to-work laws, but after 2015, the last year of our panel. This enables us to run 
a placebo test on the voting for (but not the introduction of) RTW legislation. This 
is to further address the concern that there may be unobservables correlated with the 
holding of a RTW vote which could confound our treatment effects. We replicate 
our baseline specification (panel A) and again use contiguous states as controls.43 
Panel D of Table 6 contains these placebo results and shows that there is no signifi-
cant treatment effect on any of the outcomes.44
Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design.—At the time of the 2010 MOPS sur-
vey, 22 states had RTW laws in place, mostly in the South, West, and Midwest. In 
Table 7, we compare plants in counties that are within 100 miles of state borders that 
divide states with different RTW rules. We estimate the following equation:
(4)   M i m =  θ 1  D i +  θ 2  X i +  φ B ( DISTANCE i ) +  B s,s′ +  e i , 
where  D i is a dummy variable for whether the firm is located in a state with a RTW 
law, Xi are the other observable controls (such as NAICS6 and recall dummies), 
 φ B ( DISTANCE i ) is a polynomial function of a plant’s distance to a state border (which we allow to take a different shape on either side of the border as indicated by 
the B subscript), and  B s,s′ are 74 border dummies, specific to every pair of states with 
a different RTW regime. Since we have multiple years we define variables  specific 
42 If this entry also increased local product market competition this would also generate a downward bias to our 
revenue based measure TFP measure as  mark-ups would shrink. 
43 These states are Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Illinois, Ohio, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, 
Nevada, and Iowa. 
44 We replicate panel A specification as this is the more conservative approach to the placebo. However, the 
results are very similar when repeating the placebo analysis using the specification from panel C. Specifically, no 
treatment coefficient is significant by any standard, and magnitudes are broadly similar. For example, the coefficient 
(standard error) on the treatment dummy in column 2 of panel D becomes 0.006 (0.011). 
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to the year and add time dummies (and a recall dummy) to the regression.45 We 
have 39 states who are either RTW states or their neighbors and cluster the standard 
errors at the state level.
Unlike a classic RD design, the location of the plant across the discontinuity 
(border) can be manipulated by agents. So the treatment effect we identify is a 
combination of any effects on existing plants plus the selection of plants with more 
45 Results are almost identical when we generalize the model to include border pair interacted by time dummies.
Table 7—RD Design Estimates for the Effect of RTW
Management 
score
Incentive 
management
Non-incentive 
management
High union 
(density > 80%) log(emp)
3 factor 
log(TFP)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. RD design estimates
RTW side of 0.008 0.017 0.002 −0.042 0.110 −0.012
 the border (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.054) (0.012)
Observations ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000
Panel B. RD design estimates controlling for 6-digit NAICS 
RTW side of 0.007 0.014 0.002 −0.038 0.034 −0.008
 the border (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.034) (0.012)
Observations ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000
Panel C. RD design estimates for non-tradables (25 percent lowest HHI in sample)
RTW side of 0.014 0.020 0.012 −0.031 0.080 −0.053
 the border (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.042) (0.024)
Observations ~9,200 ~9,200 ~9,200 ~9,200 ~9,200 ~9,200
Panel D. RD design estimates allowing quadratic distance functions
RTW side of 0.007 0.013 0.004 −0.051 0.037 −0.017
 the border (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.038) (0.012)
Observations ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000
Panel E. RD design estimates with Epanechnikov weights for distance from border
RTW side of 0.008 0.016 0.003 −0.040 0.031 −0.011
 the border (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.034) (0.012)
Observations ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000 ~39,000
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the establishment level). The dependent 
variable is the management score in column 1. In columns 2 and 3, the score is calculated as the unweighted aver-
age of the incentives related practices (MOPS questions 9–16) and non-incentives related practices (MOPS ques-
tions 1–8) respectively. The dependent variable in column 4 is calculated using the categories in MOPS question 
36 (2010 numbering). The dependent variable in column 5 is log of employment at the establishment, and in col-
umn 6 the log of total factor productivity, calculated using a factor share of three factors (capital, labor, and mate-
rial). The sample in panels A, B, D, and E is all MOPS observations with at least ten non-missing responses to 
management questions and a successful match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have posi-
tive value added, positive employment, and positive imputed capital in the ASM from RTW states or states with a 
RTW border. Recalls are used for respondents with at least seven years of tenure at the establishment. Sample in 
Panel C is defined similarly to Panel A, but restricted to the 25 percent of the sample from most tradable industries, 
where non-tradables are defined as industries with low regional concentration level calculated following Ellison and 
Glaeser (1997) using data from the 2007 census. All regressions include a recall dummy and year and border fixed 
effects. Panels B through E also include NAICS dummies. Panels A, B, C, and E allow for different linear trends on 
each side of the border, while panel D allows for different quadratic trends. Panel E applies Epanechnikov kernel 
for weighting observations according to distance from the border.
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structured incentive management into RTW states. Furthermore, recall that  θ 1 will 
reflect the effect of the entire bundle of state specific policies on either side of the 
border, not just RTW laws (the DID analysis is more specific in this respect). The 
identification here is essentially  cross-sectional and relies on comparing at a point 
in time establishments on two sides of the border. The key identification assumption 
is that as we shrink distance to zero, the  non-state policy related factors (e.g., eco-
nomic and geographical) become identical on either side of the border.
Figure 4 shows the RD design visually. Panel A looks at average  non-incentive 
management practices for various distances away from the border. There is no appar-
ent discontinuity in the adoption of  non-incentive practices around RTW border in 
the data. In panel B we look specifically at incentive management practices and 
observe a clear discontinuity in incentives management at the state boundary. This is 
consistent with a causal effect. Interestingly, the incentive management scores look 
broadly stable as we move away from the border. If there were very local selection 
effects so that the impact of state policies was to switch only a few highly structured 
management plants across the border, we might expect to see some bunching (a 
sudden increase in average management scores as we approach the border), which 
we do not observe.46
Table 7 reports similar outcomes to the ones reported in the DID estimates of 
Table 6 but for estimates from the RD design, allowing for different trends in dis-
tance on two sides of the border. In columns 1–3 of Table 7, the regression sample 
includes all plants in bordering pairs within 100 miles of a  state-border between two 
states with different RTW laws. In panel A, we see that the plants on the RTW side 
of the border have significantly higher incentive management scores, but there are 
46 Note that we do see more plants on the RTW side of the border, i.e., there is a bigger mass on the RTW side 
of the border, though this is not driven by bunching at the border. 
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Figure 4. Right-to-Work Regression Discontinuity
Notes: The management measure in panel A is calculated as the unweighted average of the non-incentives related 
practices (MOPS questions 1–8), and in panel B as the incentives related practices (MOPS questions 9–16). The 
sample is all MOPS observations with at least ten non-missing responses to management questions and a successful 
match to ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have positive value added, positive employment, and 
positive imputed capital in the ASM from RTW states or states with a RTW border. Recalls are used for respondents 
with at least seven years of tenure at the establishment. The figures show ten mile bin dots.
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no significant effects on other types of management practices. The magnitude of the 
effect is similar to the magnitude from the DID analysis. For example, the treatment 
effect in column 2 is 0.017, slightly larger compared to the same estimate in col-
umn 2 of Table 6. Given that these are from different identification strategies, this 
similarity is reassuring. RTW reduces union density according to column 4. We also 
find significant positive effects on employment in column 5, but again no significant 
effects on TFP.
Panel B of Table 7 includes NAICS6 dummies and shows robust effects of RTW 
(NAICS dummies are included in panels C to E as well). Specifically, the difference 
between incentive and  non-incentive management is still large, with the test for 
equality of the two coefficients rejected at the 1 percent level ( p-value = 0.007). 
Note that the magnitudes of management coefficients are even closer to the ones 
reported in panel A of Table 6 (which also controls for NAICS). As noted above, the 
RD coefficient reflects both pure treatment effects on incumbents and the fact that 
plants with more incentive management practices will likely sort onto the RTW side 
of the border. From a state policy perspective, these sorting effects are of interest, 
but if all of the effect is selection through cross border switching then this may mean 
the equilibrium impact of the policy is zero. Furthermore, even from a purely local 
perspective, the effect is  over-estimated because some of the impact may be coming 
from lower structured management scores in the  non-RTW states due to the move-
ment of plants with more structured practices to the RTW side of the border. So in 
panel C we look at plants in the  least tradable quartile of industries (industries like 
cement, wood pallet construction, or bakeries, defined in terms of being in the bot-
tom quartile of geographic concentration) that are the least likely to select on loca-
tion because of high transport costs.47 Again, we find RTW states have significantly 
higher structured management scores within this sample of relatively  non-tradable 
products for which selecting production location based on “ business-friendly” con-
ditions is harder. This, coupled with the similarity of the effect for plants further 
from the border and the DID effects on incumbents, suggests that the manage-
ment effects of RTW are not primarily due to cross-border switching. The last two 
 panels of Table 7 report technical robustness tests for the RD estimates. In panel D 
we replace the linear trends in distance from border with quadratic trends, and in 
panel E we weight observations using the Epanechnikov kernel applied to (absolute 
value of) distance from border. As these panels show, the results are not sensitive to 
the econometric details of the RD design specification.
B. Learning Spillovers: Million Dollar Plants
Do structured management practices “spill over” from one establishment to 
another? We would expect this to happen if there is learning behavior, making man-
agement qualitatively different from other factor inputs. To get closer to a causal 
effect, we study how management practices in particular counties in the United 
States change when a new, large, and typically multinational establishment (likely 
47 Our industry geographic concentration indexes are calculated following Ellison and Glaeser (1997) using the 
2007 Census of Manufactures.
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to have higher management scores) is opened in the county.48 A key challenge, of 
course, is that such counties are not selected at random. It is in fact very likely that 
counties that “won” such large multinational establishments are very different than 
a typical county in the United States. To overcome this issue, we compare counties 
that “won” the establishment with the “ runner-up” counties that competed for the 
new establishment. This approach is inspired by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti 
(2010), who study the effect of agglomeration spillovers by looking at productiv-
ity of winners and  runner-up counties for Million Dollar Plants (MDPs). We used 
Site Selection magazine to find Million Dollar Plants as described by Greenstone, 
Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010), extending the list by web searching for MDP coun-
ties and  runner-ups (see online Appendix A for more details about data construc-
tion), with our full MDP data available online.49
Following our data structure of a  five-year panel, we estimate the following 
equation:
(5)  ΔM icst  =  θ 1  ΔMDP ct +  θ 2  X icst +  P c,c′ +  f s +  e it , 
where  ΔM icst  is change in the management score for establishment  i in county  c , 
state  s between year  t − 5 and year  t ,  ΔMDP ct is a dummy that equals 1 if the county 
had an MDP opening between years  t − 5  and  t , X are other observable controls, and 
P c,c′ are 45 dummies, specific to every pair of winning and losing counties, and  f s 
are state fixed effects. The MDP opening year for the regression is set to be the first 
year the MDP shows up in the LBD in cases where the establishment is new (rather 
than an expansion) and was successfully matched to the LBD. Otherwise we use 
the announcement year + 1. We use  2005–2008 MDP openings for the  2005–2010 
changes, and  2010–2013 openings for the  2010–2015 changes to allow one or two 
years before any meaningful managerial effects occur.
Before looking at the results, we check that the observable characteristics for win-
ners and  runner-up counties are balanced (see online Appendix Table A11). We look 
at all MDPs pooled in column 1 and then separately for establishments with high and 
low manager flow between the establishment and the MDP industry codes in the next 
two columns. Of the 33 coefficients, only 5 are statistically significant. Importantly, 
there are no significant differences in  t − 10 to  t − 5 trends in employment, productiv-
ity, value added, and county characteristics between winners and  runner-ups.
Table 8 contains the spillover results with the baseline results in panel A. Column 1 
suggests a positive and significant effect of MDPs on management. In contrast to 
our RTW results, there are significant effects on both incentives and  non-incentives 
management.50 This is unsurprising, as there are no ex ante reasons to believe effects 
of MDPs should be larger on incentives management. Column 2 shows positive but 
statistically insignificant effects on TFP. As with the RTW case, this may be because 
48 Note that we do not choose these plant openings using Census data, but using public data only (see more 
details in the online Appendix A). In fact, to ensure the confidentiality of plants in our sample, we do not report 
whether these plants even appear in our data. 
49 See https://people.stanford.edu/nbloom/research. We are grateful to Hyunseob Kim for sharing an updated 
list of million dollar plants and discussing search strategies from his work, Kim (2015). 
50 The coefficients are of similar size at 0.019 (0.007) for  non-incentives and 0.020 (0.011) for incentives 
management. 
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of plant entry driving up land and input prices in MDP counties, downward biasing 
measured TFP.51 Column 3 uses employment growth as a dependent variable and 
shows positive and significant effects consistent with column 1.
Some plants are more likely to benefit from MDPs than others. In particular, if 
the MDP effect is really due to learning spillovers we would expect the benefits to 
be particularly strong if there are likely to be larger flows of managers between the 
MDP and local firms. To examine this, we pooled the Current Population Surveys 
(CPS) from 2003 to 2015 and examined the flows of managers between different 
51 Indeed, Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) reported the impact of MDPs on land prices and wages, 
so that not only land but any local land or labor intensive inputs would see higher prices.
Table 8—Management Knowledge Spillovers
 
Change in 
management
Change 
in log(TFP)
Employment 
growth
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. All industries pooled
MDP opens 0.018 0.024 0.014
(0.007) (0.017) (0.005)
Panel B. Split high/low manager flow
MDP opens × high 0.031 0.069 0.017
(0.008) (0.019) (0.006)
MDP opens × low −0.005 −0.050 0.009
(0.011) (0.034) (0.01)
p-value for equality 0.007 0.004 0.495
Panel C. Split high/low trade (demand spillovers)
MDP opens × high 0.012 0.041 0.029
(0.011) (0.033) (0.010)
MDP opens × low 0.023 0.004 0.001
(0.009) (0.032) (0.008)
p-value for equality 0.439 0.509 0.037
Panel D. Manufacturing MDPs split out
MDP opens × manufacturing 0.016 0.040 0.011
(0.007) (0.016) (0.006)
MDP opens × non-manufacturing 0.022 −0.016 0.022
(0.015) (0.038) (0.008)
p-value for equality 0.734 0.175 0.297
Observations ~2,500 ~2,500 ~2,500
Notes: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the county level). The sample is all 
MOPS observations with at least ten non-missing responses to management questions and a successful match to 
ASM, which were also included in ASM tabulations, have positive value added, positive employment, and positive 
imputed capital in the ASM in counties that were considered by Million Dollar Plants (MDPs) as part of the site 
selection process. The dependent variable is the change from t − 5 to t. For column 1: Change in management score 
winsorized at top and bottom 1 percent, column 2 Change in log(TFP) truncated at the top and bottom 1 percent, 
calculated using factor share for three factors (capital, labor, and material), column 3 Employment growth defined 
as 2 × (Lt − Lt−5)/(Lt + Lt−5). The key right-hand-side variable is a dummy indicating whether the plant was in 
the county finally selected for the plant location or not. All regressions have pair, states, industry, and recall fixed 
effects. Panel B interacts the treatment with high and low manager flow between the establishment and the MDP 
industries, and panel C splits using trade flows. High and low defined using medians, and the regression controls 
for the non-interacted High dummy. Panel D interacts the treatment with dummy indicating whether the MDP is 
in manufacturing or not. Each panel includes the p-value for equal coefficients over the split. All regressions are 
weighted by the MDP announcement employment size.
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three-digit NAICS industries. For every MDP we can observe its industry code and 
whether a plant in the treatment (or control) county is in an industry that is more 
likely to benefit from a managerial flow (which are typically in similar industries). 
We then split plants into above versus below median management flows based on the 
plant and the MDP industry codes using the bilateral matrix for employees in man-
agerial occupations from the CPS.52 Panel B of Table 8 shows that the MDP effect 
is only statistically significant for plants in those industries that are more likely to 
receive a larger managerial flow from the MDP industry.53 Consistent with this, we 
find that these “more exposed” plants also benefit from significantly higher TFP and 
jobs growth. Note that the spillover may occur in more subtle ways than simply the 
movement of managers from the MDP to local firm. Using national  inter-industry 
managerial labor flows as a “distance metric” may also reflect that there will be 
greater interactions between MDP managers and those of local firms in professional 
and social situations.
We also estimated event study versions of MDP entry as their entry dates vary 
by year.54 This is challenging because we only have (at most) three observations 
of management at five-year intervals, so there are large standard errors. Panel A of 
Figure 5 shows this for the simple MDP effect (the generalization of Table 8, panel 
A) which peaks significantly  3–4 years after entry. The drop in impact after the third 
year could reflect some gradual depreciation of the MDP impact as there is less to 
be learned by incumbent plants over time and the information about management 
practices may also start to diffuse to the plants in control counties. It could also 
reflect that we are mixing establishments who differentially benefit from the MDPs. 
Indeed, panel B of Figure 5 breaks down the MDP effect by predicted managerial 
labor flows (as in Table 8, panel B). There is no sign of an MDP effect in the years 
before and immediately on entry, but for establishments with high predicted mana-
gerial flows with these MDPs we see a significant spillovers after a year, while for 
plants with low predicted managerial flows we do not see significant spillovers.
There are many other ways to build up a distance metric between the MDP and 
the incumbent plants. Panel C of Table 8 uses the goods  input-output matrix. We 
do not find much evidence of larger management to TFP spillovers associated with 
higher trade links, but we do find some larger employment effects. This is con-
sistent with incumbent plants benefiting from a demand effect if an MDP is in a 
 buyer-seller relationship, but not learning spillovers. Panel D looks at the product 
market dimension dividing MDPs into manufacturing versus  non-manufacturing 
MDPs. Consistent with the idea that our manufacturing plants are more likely to 
benefit from manufacturing MDPs, only manufacturing MDPs are statistically sig-
nificant. However, the coefficients on the two types of MDPs are not significantly 
different from each other.
52 We use employees in occupation classification “Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupations,” 
corresponding to occupation codes 003 to 037 in the IPUMS harmonized occ1990 variable. 
53  We also find a similar pattern using the bilateral flow matrix for all employees, but the results are weaker 
than just using managerial flows. Whereas the  p-test of the significance between the two types of industries for 
managerial flows is significant at the 5 or 10 percent levels as shown in Table 8, a similar test for all employee flows 
has  p-values of 0.23.
54 We cannot implement event studies on right-to-work laws in Table 6 because both our treatment states intro-
duced them in the same year (2012).
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We conclude that MDPs do appear to have significant effects on management, 
but only if plants are closely connected as revealed through managerial labor mar-
kets (rather than just being in an  input-output or product market relationship). 
These improvements in management also feed through into jobs and productivity 
gains.
Panel A
Panel B
−1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
−0.05
−0.1
0
0.05
0.1
0 2 3 4 51
−1 0 2
t
t
High manager flow
Low manager flow
High manager flow 90% Cl
Low manager flow 90% Cl
3 4 51
All industries pooled 90% Cl
Figure 5. Event Studies of Impact of Million Dollar Plants on Incumbent Plants
Notes: These are event studies estimated in a window of 1 year before the MDP arrives (t = −1) through to 5 years 
afterward (t = 5). Panel A is the dynamic version of the results in column 1 of Panel A in Table 8 with the same 
controls variables (dummy for each pair of MDP winner and loser, recall dummy, and NAICS and state dummies). 
Panel B allows MDP effect to differ by whether incumbent plant in industry where there is a high frequency of 
manager flows between the MDP’s industry and the plant’s industry (above median is High and below median is 
Low). Sample is all MOPS observations 10 or more nonmissing responses to management questions (recalls only 
considered if respondent had at least seven years of tenure). We also require (i) successful match to ASM; (ii) pos-
itive values of value added, employment, materials, and capital; (iii) all observations appear in at least two years 
(out of 2005, 2010, and 2015) in a county which either had an MDP established between 2005 and 2016 (winner), 
or competed for an MDP and lost (loser).
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C. Discussion
Through the lens of the simple model in online Appendix B there are at least 
two mechanisms through which the  reduced-form evidence of our drivers could 
influence management practices. First, by reducing the effective “price” of adopt-
ing structured management practices RTW and MDP could increase management 
scores. This could then improve productivity as suggested by Table 1. However, an 
alternative story would be that RTW and MDP increased productivity through some 
 non-management mechanism (e.g., the adoption of new technologies) and that this 
increase in productivity caused the firm to grow and therefore increase all factor 
inputs including managerial capital.
We cannot directly rule out this second mechanism with our data, but several 
pieces of evidence suggest that it is not the whole story. First, the RTW effect is not 
on all managerial practices, but specifically over those related to incentives, which is 
exactly where we would expect this specific regulation to have its largest effect. One 
might believe that incentives are easier to adjust than other types of management 
(although one could make the opposite case that pay and promotions are actually 
very sensitive organizational issues and are difficult practices to change). However, 
we can directly look at this by disaggregating the management score in the MDP 
analysis. As discussed above, here we find that if anything the MDP effects look 
stronger on the  non-incentive aspects of management, such as lean manufacturing 
and monitoring. This is plausible as these aspects may be the harder ones to under-
stand and implement in the absence of demonstration by another firm. Second, we 
can condition on employment growth to absorb the overall effects on size. These 
regressions must be interpreted with caution as we have an endogenous variable on 
the right-hand side, but it is striking that the coefficient on our treatment variable 
does not fall by much in these “conditional  management-capital demand” equa-
tions.55 Thirdly, it is worth noting that the effects of these drivers is generally stron-
ger on management than it is on TFP, which is the opposite of what we would expect 
if they were affecting management via TFP.
D. Other Drivers
We have focused on two important drivers of management: business environment 
and learning spillovers. But there are many other potential factors. In Bloom et al. 
(2017), the NBER working paper version of this paper, we also analyze exogenous 
variation in two additional factors: education and competition. We find robust evi-
dence that higher levels of human capital and competition are both positively asso-
ciated with higher levels of the management scores.
55 For MDP the coefficient changes from 0.018 in column 1 of Table 8, panel A to 0.017 with a standard 
error of 0.006; for the RD Design RTW in column 2 of Table 7, panel A it falls from 0.017 to 0.012 with a 
standard error of 0.005; and in the DID RTW of column 2 of Table 6, panel A it falls from 0.013 to 0.009 with 
a standard error of 0.006.
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V. Conclusions and Future Research
This paper analyzes a recent Census Bureau survey of structured management 
practices in 2010 and 2015 for about 35,000 plants in each wave across the United 
States. Analyzing these data reveals three major findings. First, there is a large vari-
ation in management practices across plants, with about 40 percent of this variation 
being across plants within the same firm. This  within-firm  across-plant variation 
in management cannot easily be explained by many classes of theories that focus 
on characteristics of the CEO, corporate governance, or ownership (e.g., by family 
firms or multinationals) because these would tend to affect management across the 
firm as a whole.
Second, we find that these management practices are tightly linked to several 
measures of performance, and they account for about one-fifth of the  cross-firm 
productivity spread, a fraction that is as large as or larger than technological factors 
such as R&D or IT. Furthermore, management practices are very predictive of firm 
survival rates, in fact, more so than TFP.
Third, we find causal evidence that two drivers are very important in changing 
management practices. The business environment (as measured by  right-to-work 
laws) increases the adoption of structured incentives management practices. 
Learning spillovers as measured by the arrival of large new entrants in the county 
(Million Dollar Plants) increases the management scores of incumbents.
Although both of these drivers are qualitatively important across geographical 
regions, they cannot explain the large variation of management practices within the 
same region, much of which is within the same firm. This is not obviously due to 
firm-wide factors such as CEO identity or corporate governance. It is suggestive of 
the importance of frictions to within-firm changes in management and organization 
as discussed by Gibbons and Henderson (2013) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
among others. While this paper has provided some answers concerning drivers of 
differences in management practices, there is still ample room for new theory, data, 
and designs to help understand one of the oldest questions in economics and busi-
ness: why is there such large heterogeneity in management practices?
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